U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators: What Do Petitioners Expect, and Are They Correct?

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U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators: What Do Petitioners Expect, and Are They Correct?

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dc.contributor.author Feinberg, Robert M.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-18T15:15:18Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-18T15:15:18Z
dc.date.created 2004-11
dc.date.issued 2004-11
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1961/4956
dc.description Working Paper No. 2004-17. 22 pages. en
dc.description.abstract We contribute to the literature on the political economy of U.S. antidumping enforcement through two related empirical studies. First, we analyze the pattern – and macroeconomic determinants -- of country-specific antidumping petitions filed by U.S. firms against 15 countries between 1981 and 1998 (examining quarterly data). Importantly, we suggest that “learning” by petitioners about the administration – in practice -- of the U.S. trade laws has led to changes in the roles of these macroeconomic determinants over time. We then investigate the effect these same indicators have had on the success experienced by petitioners during that same time period, explaining outcomes in 473 U.S. antidumping cases by macroeconomic, country, and industry effects. en
dc.description.sponsorship Department of Economics, American University en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Department of Economics, American University en
dc.subject.other Antidumping law en
dc.subject.other Exchange rate pass-through en
dc.title U.S. Antidumping Enforcement and Macroeconomic Indicators: What Do Petitioners Expect, and Are They Correct? en
dc.type Working Paper en


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