The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies and the Byrd Amendment

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The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies and the Byrd Amendment

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dc.contributor.author Olson, Kara M.
dc.contributor.author Liebman, Benjamin H.
dc.date.accessioned 2009-02-18T14:38:33Z
dc.date.available 2009-02-18T14:38:33Z
dc.date.created 2004-09
dc.date.issued 2004-09
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/1961/4948
dc.description Working Paper No. 2004-08. 31 pages. en
dc.description.abstract This is the first empirical study to examine Congressional support of an antidumping law that directs the U.S. Customs Service to distribute collected duties to protected firms. The law produces a highly transparent measure of how much each firm is rewarded for its rent-seeking efforts to secure the bill’s passage. Therefore, this policy provides researchers with a unique setting in which to study the link between campaign contributions, Congressional behavior, and the subsequent financial returns to firms. Our empirical results show that campaign contributions from potential beneficiaries increased the likelihood that lawmakers would sponsor the law, and political contributions from the law’s beneficiaries increased with the rewards that they expected to receive. en
dc.description.sponsorship Department of Economics, American University en
dc.language.iso en_US en
dc.publisher Department of Economics, American University en
dc.subject.other Campaign contributions en
dc.subject.other Rent-seeking en
dc.subject.other Byrd Amendment en
dc.subject.other Antidumping en
dc.title The Returns from Rent-Seeking: Campaign Contributions, Firm Subsidies and the Byrd Amendment en
dc.type Working Paper en


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