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<title>School of International Service (AU-SIS)</title>
<link href="http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/5096" rel="alternate"/>
<subtitle/>
<id>http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/5096</id>
<updated>2013-05-21T06:24:50Z</updated>
<dc:date>2013-05-21T06:24:50Z</dc:date>
<entry>
<title>Putting the Canal on the Map:  Panamanian Agenda-setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings</title>
<link href="http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/14085" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Long, Tom</name>
</author>
<id>http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/14085</id>
<updated>2013-01-23T08:42:18Z</updated>
<published>2013-01-22T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Putting the Canal on the Map:  Panamanian Agenda-setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings
Long, Tom
In the early 1970s, Panama’s negotiations with the United States over the status of the Panama Canal had come to a frustrating standstill. The military government of Omar Torrijos had rejected the unratified treaties tabled by Marco Robles and Lyndon B. Johnson, only to find itself facing much less generous positions from the Nixon administration. Realizing that the issue of the canal was being ignored in Washington, the Panamanian government launched a new strategy of internationalizing the previously bilateral issue. To do so, it created and exploited an unusual, high-profile forum: extraordinary meetings of the U.N. Security Council in March 1973. In those meetings, Panama deftly isolated the United States in order to raise the issue’s profile and amplify the costs of leaving the matter unsettled. By using underutilized Panamanian sources, this article looks at how that meeting occurred, the burst of progress that followed, and how this early stage shaped the environment for the final negotiations under Jimmy Carter several years later.
This is a pre-peer-reviewed version of Tom Long, “Putting the Canal on the Map: Panamanian Agenda-setting and the 1973 Security Council Meetings,” Diplomatic History, (forthcoming)
</summary>
<dc:date>2013-01-22T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>THE COLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH IN THE AMERICAS: The Search for a Synthetic Interpretation of U.S. Policy</title>
<link href="http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/14084" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Pastor, Robert</name>
</author>
<author>
<name>Long, Tom</name>
</author>
<id>http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/14084</id>
<updated>2013-01-23T08:42:10Z</updated>
<published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">THE COLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH IN THE AMERICAS: The Search for a Synthetic Interpretation of U.S. Policy
Pastor, Robert; Long, Tom
</summary>
<dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Electrifying the base? Aid and incumbent advantage in Ghana</title>
<link href="http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/14083" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Briggs, Ryan C.</name>
</author>
<id>http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/14083</id>
<updated>2013-01-17T08:42:07Z</updated>
<published>2012-12-12T00:00:00Z</published>
<summary type="text">Electrifying the base? Aid and incumbent advantage in Ghana
Briggs, Ryan C.
In 1999, the year before Ghana’s 2000 election, the country experienced a&#13;
large, unexpected decline in aid. The incumbent National Democratic&#13;
Congress (NDC) lost the election. Did the decline in aid hurt the NDC at the&#13;
polls, or was it simply incidental? Using data from a national, World Bankfunded&#13;
electrification project, this article shows that the NDC was able to&#13;
allocate aid according to explicitly political criteria. The article also exploits&#13;
a quasi-experiment in aid disbursements to show that electrification caused&#13;
NDC voting to increase in the constituencies that received electrification.&#13;
Pre-electoral aid fluctuations exert a modest but measurable force on voting&#13;
patterns. These findings add weight to calls for donors to coordinate to reduce&#13;
aid volatility. They also show that incumbent governments can allocate aid&#13;
strategically to secure votes, even under the best-case scenario of strict donor&#13;
monitoring in an established democracy.
</summary>
<dc:date>2012-12-12T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SIS 604 - Lecture 10</title>
<link href="http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/5098" rel="alternate"/>
<author>
<name>Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus</name>
</author>
<id>http://aladinrc.wrlc.org:80/handle/1961/5098</id>
<updated>2009-03-27T07:45:46Z</updated>
<published>2009-03-26T16:38:37Z</published>
<summary type="text">SIS 604 - Lecture 10
Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus
A lecture for my "Masterworks of International Relations" course. The lecture sets up the reading of Karl Deutsch's "Political Community in the North Atlantic Area."
One audio recording and one PowerPoint presentation in pdf format.
</summary>
<dc:date>2009-03-26T16:38:37Z</dc:date>
</entry>
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