DSpace Community: Schools and Colleges (GT)

The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science

Thu, 12 Jul 2007 17:38:49 GMT

Title: The Scope of Hermeneutics in Natural Science

Authors: Heelan, Patrick

Abstract: Hermeneutics or interpretation is concerned with the generation, transmission, and acceptance of meaning within the lifeworld and was the original method of the human sciences stemming from F. Schleiermacher and W. Dilthey. Hermeneutic philosophy refers mostly to M. Heidegger’s. This paper addresses natural science from the perspective of Heidegger’s analysis of meaning and interpretation. Its purpose is to incorporate into the philosophy of science those aspects of historicality, culture, and tradition that are absent from the traditional analysis of theory and explanation, to re-orient the current discussion about scientific realism around the hermeneutics of meaning and truth in science, and to establish some relationship between the current philosophy of natural science and hermeneutical philosophy. The paper has particular relevance to the history and social studies of science and technology

Heisenberg and radical theoretic change

Thu, 12 Jul 2007 13:59:45 GMT

Title: Heisenberg and radical theoretic change

Authors: Heelan, Patrick

Abstract: Heisenberg, in constructing quantum mechanics, explicitly followed certain principles exemplified, as he believed, in Einstein's construction of the special theory of relativity which for him was the paradigm for radical theoretic change in physics. These were the principles of (i) scientific realism, (ii) stability of background knowledge, (iii) E-observability, (iv) contextual re-interpretation, (v) pragmatic continuity, (vi) model continuity, simplicity. Fifty years later, in retrospect, Heisenberg added the following two: a principle of non-proliferation of competing theories — scientific revolutions are not a legitimate goal of physics — and (ix) a principle of tenacity — existing theories are to be conserved as far as possible. The conservative as well as the revolutionary potential of these principles is then discussed. A more penetrating philosophical criticism of these principles is postponed.

Husserl's Later Philosophy of Natural Science

Thu, 12 Jul 2007 13:44:52 GMT

Title: Husserl's Later Philosophy of Natural Science

Authors: Heelan, Patrick

Abstract: Husserl argues in the Crisis that the prevalent tradition of positive science in his time had a philosophical core, called by him "Galilean science", that mistook the quest for objective theory with the quest for truth. Husserl is here referring to Göttingen science of the Golden Years. For Husserl, theory "grows" out of the "soil" of the pre-scientific, that is, pre-theoretical, life-world. Scientific truth finally is to be sought not in theory but rather in the pragmatic-perceptual praxes of measurement. Husserl is faulted for taking measuring processes to be "infinitely perfectible". The dependence of new scientific phenomena on the existence of pri or "pre-scientific" inductive praxis is analyzed, also Husserl's residual objectivism and failure to appreciate the hermeneutical character of measurement. Though not a scientific (theory-)realist, neither was he an instrumentalist, but he was a scientific (phenomean-)realist.

Phenomenology and the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences

Thu, 12 Jul 2007 13:21:59 GMT

Title: Phenomenology and the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences

Authors: Heelan, Patrick

Abstract: In the assessment of scientific theory and practice, the critique of the analytic/empiricist view of science made via the phenomenological orientation of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau- Ponty and others towards the Lifeworld and Heidegger’s hermeneutics (or interpretation) of experience has made it possible to assign different roles to theory and praxis. Theory is assigned to technological design for the purposes of environmental control, while praxis is assigned to ontological understanding for the purpose of human culture. Scientific theories then have a ’Janus-like face,’ one side looks in the direction of computational and technological control which is not constitutive of scientific knowledge but is merely a resource or tool for multiple praxes, the other looks in the direction of human culture which is ultimately constitutive of ontological scientific knowledge. This bivalence underscores the prevalence of metaphor in scientific discourse and, in particular, in medical science and clinical practice under conditions where modern culture and the analytic/empiricist view tend to mask the presence of metaphor in such discourse. It was shown, however, that under the broader analysis of phenomenology, metaphor is as fundamental for true scientific discourse as literality is for the analytic/empiricist view. Since the theoretical is mathematical and both the practical and the praxical are empirical, it makes no sense to predicate mathematical models literally of the phenomenological Lifeworld; at best, the two must come together consciously in some unambiguous but metaphorical way guided by professional experts in the spirit of (what Aristotle called) ‘phronesis’ (prudent action), aware that they are seeking no more (and no less) than a praxical consensus about a set of relevant soluble Lifeworld issues.

Fleck's contribution to Epistemology

Wed, 11 Jul 2007 19:56:04 GMT

Title: Fleck's contribution to Epistemology

Authors: Heelan, Patrick

Abstract: Ludwik Fleck opposed the two most prominant schools of the philosophy of science of his time: the Logical Positivism of Carnap, Schlick and others of the Vienna Circle, and the Historicism of Durkheim, Levy-Bruhl, Jerusalem and the sociologists of knowledge. Fleck objected to two of the fundamental principles of Logical Positivism: (1) the strict separation it imposed between scientific fact (expressed by sentences in a purely observational language) and both logic and theory; and (2) the dogmatizing of extensional logic as the unique and normative logic for scientific theory construction. In contrast, he stated the inner dependence of fact, theory and logic, and the dependence of both on a historical socially-conditioned process. Fleck objected to the strict separation made by Historicism between the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaft en) and the social sciences (Geisteswissenschaften), stemming from the assumed fixity or objectivity of established scientific facts in the natural sciences and the assumption that in contrast `social facts' were the changing product of conventional and historical Weltanschauungen that leave the facts of natural science, however, unchanged. He stated that the descriptive frameworks of scientific facts in the natural sciences were themselves the product of intentional processes that were both culturally conditioned and historical; they were not, however, mere conventions, but the products of a hermeneutics of experimental experience.

C-Reactive Protein and Heart Disease

Mon, 08 May 2006 16:38:10 GMT

Title: C-Reactive Protein and Heart Disease

Authors: Schacht, Sydney; Skowron, Martyna; Weinstein, Alexandra; Winokur, Jenna; Zare, Stephanie; Angerio, Alan

C-Reactive Protein in Sickle Cell Crisis

Mon, 08 May 2006 16:35:59 GMT

Title: C-Reactive Protein in Sickle Cell Crisis

Authors: Blainefield, Mike; DeLong, Mary Kate; DiLeo, Laura; Dimaya, Roland; Angerio, Allan

CRP as an Indicator of Vascular Damage in Sickle-Cell Disease

Mon, 08 May 2006 16:34:11 GMT

Title: CRP as an Indicator of Vascular Damage in Sickle-Cell Disease

Authors: Simoneaux, Michael; Tavaluc, Raluca; Tchuenbou, Jeanne; Zielinski, Elizabeth; Angerio, Allan