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Book reviews

Amitai Etzioni, *Security first: for a muscular, moral foreign policy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2007, ISBN10 0300108575, ISBN13 9780300108576, hbk, 336 pp

True to his record as one of the most unusual and independent policy thinkers in the United States today, Amitai Etzioni has produced a book of recommendations for strategy in the 'war on terror' that cannot be classified according to the usual stereotypes of conservative or liberal, dove or hawk, let alone Republican or Democrat. For that reason, it may prove unacceptable to all the leading candidates for president next year, from both parties. If so, it would be a great pity, for Etzioni's recommendations, if accepted, would do much to extricate the US from the strategic quagmire in which it flounders in the Muslim world and beyond. Above all, he seeks to design a strategy that would contain real elements of both realism and morality.

Etzioni differs from some liberals, and many Europeans, in putting 'security first', and therefore taking the threat of terrorism extremely seriously. He does not believe that the terrorist threat can be met simply by enhanced police, judicial and intelligence measures. His concern relates especially to the threat of some form of nuclear attack. Continuing an argument that he began with proponents of the 'US can survive a nuclear attack' school during the Cold War, he points out that even if the direct effects were limited, such an attack would bring about a kind of 'regime change' within the US, and would irrevocably alter US culture and institutions for the worse. He emphasizes that the only truly effective way to counter this threat is to help prevent terrorist access to nuclear materials, especially in the former Soviet Union.

In other respects, however, Etzioni differs strongly from the prevailing consensus among both Republicans and the hawkish liberals who dominate the Democratic Party's foreign and security establishment. He has an acute sense of the structural weaknesses of the present US position in the world, and the limitations on US power; he is extremely sceptical of democracy promotion as either possible or useful in the context of the war on terror; and he believes strongly that the allies whom the US really needs to woo in the Muslim world are not liberals, but moderate religious conservatives.

Etzioni points out that for the overwhelming majority of people in the world, their basic security and, above all, that of their family, ultimately trumps concerns about freedom and democracy—an attitude ascribable to any parent in the US. This, after all, is the basic theme of endless Hollywood films on the 'vigilante' theme. This is obscured for Westerners as, due to our particular historical experience, we have come to associate such security with democracy. We should be able to recognize, however, that this association simply does not work for people with other historical experiences and, given what we have seen in Iraq in recent years and in Russia in the 1990s, there may be real and valid reasons for this. As Etzioni argues, only when basic needs of security, including economic security, have been met can there be any hope of creating stable foundations for democracy, even in the longer term. Moreover, because of the immense weight of negative baggage the US brings with it in many parts of the world, democratization can only rarely be effectively promoted from Washington.

Following on from this, Etzioni recommends a strategy of engagement with what he calls 'illiberal moderates' in the Muslim world, rather than the liberals to whom much of the US political and intellectual establishment is attached. Etzioni argues that liberals may represent only tiny proportions of their own societies and, in many cases, may not really be liberals at all, but rather authoritarians in waiting. He takes strong issue with predictions by Samuel Huntington, Bernard Lewis and others of an inevitable 'clash of civilisations' between the West and Islam, and with the arguments of Daniel Pipes and others who maintain that all Muslim religious conservatives should be treated as actual or potential supporters of Al-Qaeda. Etzioni contends that it is precisely because these figures are conservatives that they in fact dread Al-Qaeda's revolutionary ideology.

As Etzioni points out, all the major world religions have contained strong elements of both pacific teaching and extreme bellicosity. The proper goal should be that of encouraging the former against the latter in the Muslim world. This, however, can come about only through working together with genuine representatives of Muslim tradition, and not with figures who have little to do with Islam or in some cases have publicly broken with their own tradition. In the end, we need to recognize two things: that an absolutely critical aspect of the war on terror is an ideological and political civil war within the Muslim world itself and that, by definition, this is a struggle that can be won only by Muslims.

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King's College London

Ian Shapiro, *Containment: rebuilding a strategy against global terror*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007, ISBN10 0691129282, ISBN13 9780691129280, hbk, 192 pp

Ian Shapiro's book offers a compelling alternative to President George W Bush's new global strategy, as it concisely demonstrates why and how the 'containment' strategy of the Cold War is vastly superior. Shapiro makes a strong case that the 'containment' strategy should never have been discarded, but instead adjusted to a new cluster of threats. It would be a mistake to dismiss this little volume as just a clever academic exercise: although many of its points have already been made by critics of the Bush strategy, until now no one has systematically demonstrated that going back to 'containment' is a serious option.

The author, a distinguished professor of political science, begins by stripping the veneer off Bush's policies, and reveals how unilateral diplomacy and offensive military action have undermined American power. He next elaborates a new version of the Cold War 'containment' strategy. Critics will have difficulty refuting his diagnosis of the Bush strategy and its results, namely, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, letting Israel systematically encroach on Palestinian territory, and needlessly souring relations with Western Europe, but some will take strong exception to how Shapiro proposes to deal with these and other issues. They will boggle at his view of the nuclear proliferation problem, his more defensive approach to terrorist groups, and his detached judgments on how to deal with Israel and the Palestinians. Some will be surprised by his lack of enthusiasm for the policy of 'spreading democracy', especially in light of his international reputation as a leading student of democratization.

These are the larger Bush icons that Shapiro defaces, but not the only ones. He is justifiably scathing about the failure of the American political system to have provided a comprehensive public debate on such a radicalization of US strategy in so short a time with so much at risk. Here, of course, he reflects a growing wave of bewilderment among both ordinary citizens and policy wonks alike: 'How did this happen?', they often mumble today as they watch the war in Iraq, the precipitous decline in America's international standing, sustained hysteria as a counter-terrorism policy, and the explosive growth in the financial costs of these follies.

Should we take seriously a return to the 'containment' strategy? Even most of Bush's critics would dismiss it out of hand. Carl von Clausewitz would not. His study of over two decades of the Napoleonic wars leads him to conclude that 'the superiority of the defense over the offense (if rightly understood) is very great' (*On war*, 20). This was the underlying wisdom of US containment strategy during the Cold War: it reduces operational risks, it is morally advantageous in attracting allies and other international support, and it is (for the foregoing reasons) far cheaper. Shapiro does not invoke Clausewitz, but he could.

Shapiro's overall case is compelling. Still, some of his views will justifiably provoke quarrels, but they will not be easy to dismiss. Perhaps the most shocking is his rather relaxed approach to nuclear proliferation. Should we be convinced that his attitude is the correct one? Eventually, we will be forced to do so: driven by hysteria, the implementation of US non-proliferation policy has actually accelerated proliferation. Shapiro's approach is likely to be more effective precisely because it recognizes that proliferation cannot be stopped if other countries are determined to acquire nuclear weapons, and that their insecurity is most often the source of their desire to have such weapons. A policy that acknowledges these two facts is likely to be more successful in slowing the spread of nuclear weapons. And I believe that Shapiro is also correct in his claim that terrorists are highly unlikely to be able to acquire the technical knowledge and support capabilities required to maintain a nuclear weapon for long periods, transport it, and initiate a nuclear explosion. These are not trivial skills.

Shapiro's lack of evangelical spirit for spreading democracy may also raise some eyebrows. While his case is cogent, I have a cavil with the way he appears to conflate classical liberalism, or 'constitutional order', with democracy. They are not the same. Introducing elections is not the same as establishing a constitutional order. Most of the world's new democracies are highly 'illiberal' and are likely to remain so indefinitely. Greater awareness of this would sharply reduce America's evangelism of democracy. By contrast, it is wiser to support 'liberty' since this does not necessarily dictate the type of regime other countries must adopt while still allowing the US to hold the moral and political high ground.

Shapiro arrives at the same point—albeit by a different route—by calling for a more cautious approach to spreading democracy. He rightly warns against open-ended support for dictatorships. By failing to de-conflate democracy and liberalism, however, he allows the democracy evangelists a much greater chance to win the policy argument. Still, among the growing number of critiques of the Bush strategy, his is the most comprehensive and, arguably, the most convincing.

Harald Wydra, *Communism and the emergence of democracy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006, ISBN10 0521851696, ISBN13 9780521851695, hbk, 314 pp

Communism and democracy are not words often joined today: Harald Wydra's *Communism and the emergence of democracy* deserves credit for reminding us that for most of the 20th century, there were two distinct models of democracy and that the eventual dominance of the liberal pluralistic definition was far from ordained.

Wydra's aim is to bring communism back into the study of democracy. In so doing, he not only explores communism's influence on the politics of the 20th century, but also delivers several well-placed blows against the prevailing intellectual orthodoxy of the transitional democracy paradigm. He argues instead for democracy as a process of meaning-formation: 'Memory', he writes 'has been a democratizing force by making consciousness the centre of resistance to attempts to maintain total power over people' (244). All in all, a *tour de force* that restores a critical subject to its central place in modern history, theorizes critically and creatively about today's conventional wisdom on democracy, and offers a valuable and original construct to reinterpret events.

Communism, Wydra notes, is '[t]he future that failed' (244). He examines in detail the rise of Bolshevik power, the impact of the Cold War, the growing and subversive influence of dissidence and, finally, communism's collapse. Bolshevism was bestowed by catastrophe and Stalin maintained the revolution by repression and terror: 'Hatred and terror became fundamental to communist state-formation, as communist techniques of social control and power maintenance entailed an internalization of violence' (124). Despite this deep contempt for human life, clear to anyone who cared to look, '[f]or many historians, intellectuals, and large parts of society, the Bolshevik Revolution was perceived as genuinely democratic and kindled enthusiasm inside the country and abroad' (135). Communism may have been a God that failed, but it was a God that millions genuinely worshipped.

Wydra succinctly describes the series of cataclysmic events that brought the Bolsheviks to power, but their success was not a foregone conclusion. This is a point that Wydra returns to again and again in contrasting his description of the emergence and impact of communism with the favoured typologies of current theorists of democracy. Classifying into the common categories of 'pre-communist', 'communist' or 'post-communist', or employing the categories of 'authoritarian', 'transitional' or 'consolidated', in Wydra's view, 'reduces legacies to structural constraints that rest upon obsolete models of political development' (25). We have fallen into the old positivist trap of envisioning '[p]ower as an objective force used to control behaviour and attitudes of people by means of legally enforced systems of rules, [which] conceals the complexity of the socio-genesis of political order' (1). Democracy becomes a developmental goal, and we judge historical evolution by outcomes. But the key finding of Wydra's book is that '[t]he evolution of democracy—both as a value and as a constitutional form of government—has not been a goal of history, but an "accident"' (2).

Communism and the emergence of democracy highlights a political anthropology of transformative experiences. Democracy is not only about political norms or legal codes, it is equally a lengthy, ongoing narrative. A political anthropology approach shifts attention away from positivist categories, in favour of studying the decisive influence of key events—or tipping points—upon individual attitudes. Wydra quotes Milan Kundera, who has written that '[t]he struggle

of man against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting' (219). Wydra describes at length how the Soviet regime tried to make history a secret, but memory and truth-telling eventually weakened this dam of repression. 'Communism', he writes, 'not only destroyed memories but also produced the counter-measures that contributed decisively to its own dismantling.' (242).

Wydra, thankfully, is not alone in highlighting the importance of memory as a force that shapes events. The Canadian historian, Erna Paris, in *Long shadows: truth lies and history*, explores how Germany, France and Japan have each interpreted their experience in World War II differently: atonement in Germany, myth-making in France, and denial in Japan. What one remembers, or, just as importantly, what one forgets or never knew, is crucial to identity and morality. After three years of travel to the places that are the centrepiece of her book, Paris concludes: 'I am inspired by how fiercely people will fight to chronicle their personal and collective history in the face of an official history that has been falsified' (449).

That is Wydra's message too. His most moving chapter is on the articulation of dissidence, and how the traumatic societal experiences of revolution and defeat were 'important forces from "below" that transformed meanings and consciousness among the citizenry in some parts of the "Soviet bloc" ... the primary goal was not to topple communist power but to disclose its artificiality and falseness, a process that started with de-Stalinization. Such experiences were radically political, or they were lived as concrete experiences of solidarity and community' (163–164). Democracy, therefore, for Wydra, is at its best a civilizing process that leads to meaning-formation.

Wydra's work is a book of theory that makes a significant contribution to the ongoing debate on how best to conceptualize democracy. His audience is academe, not policymakers. But his emphasis on memory, the importance of narrative, the value of dissidence, the weaknesses of a priori typologies, and the galvanizing impact of catastrophic events all have application to the British and American decision to try to bring democracy to Iraq on the tips of bayonets. Catastrophes brought about the Bolshevik Revolution. Human rights outrages on a monumental scale and the slow, gradual wave of revulsion against them brought about communism's demise. The invasion of Iraq has also brought catastrophic violence in its wake. Fifty years from now, Iraq's collective memory of democracy may be permanently scarred by the colossal blunders of democracy's advocates. For Iraqis, the meaning of the invasion might be imperialism and the formation may be a conviction that democracy is a sham.

Thomas S Axworthy © 2007
Queen's University, Ontario

Daniel W Drezner, *All politics is global: explaining international regulatory regimes*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2007, ISBN10 0691096414, ISBN13 9780691096414, hbk, 254 pp

The increasing economic interlinkages among the most different countries of the globe—better known as globalization—have received a remarkable degree of public as well as academic attention. It therefore seems hardly surprising that a lot of theorizing on the effects of economic globalization has taken place. Most scholars seem to agree that globalization undermines the state's capacity to regulate effectively. This presumed erosion of state power suggests that new

actors, such as multinational corporations or non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are increasingly shaping the global regulatory agenda. But has globalization really eroded the regulatory power of national governments? This is the main research question that Daniel Drezner addresses in this book.

The simple answer to that question is 'no'. Drezner's core argument is that great powers, such as the United States or the European Union, still dominate international regulatory regimes. Their power stems from the large size of their internal economic markets, which turns them into regulatory 'price-makers' (34). If great powers manage to agree, they can effectively govern any transnational issue. But if they possess diverging preferences, regulatory coordination becomes ineffective, and non-state actors will attempt to stand in for them. This reasoning corresponds to the argument made by David Vogel in his seminal work *Trading up: consumer and environmental regulation in a global economy*. Yet, Drezner's way of modelling the relevance of great powers within his 'revisionist' theory of international relations is more clear-cut and explicit. By explaining how domestic factors account for preference formation, he opens the black box between the interests of great powers and the outcomes of international bargaining. In doing so, he emphasizes the relevance of adjustment costs that emerge from altering the existing regulatory arrangements. These tend to be high if domestic groups use their political voice rather than the exit option, which is usually the case if regulation targets are relatively immobile sectors. Thus, Drezner's primary aim is to bring great powers back into the body of theoretical work, though without disclaiming that non-state actors also play a role.

The author develops his argument by using simple normal form games with two players. In a first step, he introduces a coordination game, in which none of the actors possesses coercive power. Solving the game reveals two equilibria. First, if the adjustment costs exceed the perceived benefits of harmonization, the equilibrium outcome is that of no coordination. Second, if the public benefits from coordination outweigh the costs of adjustments, coordination becomes a possible equilibrium. In a second step, Drezner modifies the standard game by introducing economic power. Accordingly, the introduction of market power eliminates the no-coordination equilibrium of the former game, leaving coordination at the great power's ideal point as the only equilibrium outcome.

On the basis of this game-theoretic model, Drezner develops a typology of regulatory processes, which addresses both the interests of the great powers as well as the potential influence of non-state actors. The main point of the chapter is that the introduction of new actors does not influence governance outcomes, but only governance processes. If the preferences of the great powers and other governments are congruent, then harmonized standards are the most likely outcome. This leads to a 'regime complex' (73) of universal international governmental organizations (IGOs). When great powers face low adjustment costs but the other governments are confronted with higher ones, coordination will take the form of 'club standards' (75). Again, great powers will rely on universal IGOs. By contrast, 'rival standards' (78) will be the result if great powers lack a bargaining core among each other, culminating in competing regulatory blocs. Finally, no global standards, or 'sham standards' (81), are the most likely outcome if low coordination benefits or high adjustment costs erode the bargaining core between great powers as well as other countries.

The second part of the book consists of four case studies for testing and refining the predictions of the revisionist model. The first in-depth analysis of the global governance of the internet illustrates that great power governments still dominate regulatory outcomes, even if they entrust IGOs and NGOs with governance. The second chapter explains the global financial regulation in terms of the club standards model. The subsequent analysis of the treatment of genetically modified organisms provides an example of rival standards, since the US and the EU regulate their production and consumption differently. The final analysis on the push of global civil society to modify the intellectual property rights regime represents a 'deviant case' (177), which somehow challenges the revisionist model. This case study's purpose is to enhance the model's predictive power through theoretical refinement.

Although sometimes too narrative, *All politics is global* is a highly readable, authoritative, and well-investigated piece of political science literature on the globalization–global governance nexus. The explicit strength of the book is the logical and consistent development of the theory of regulatory outcomes, as well as the rigorous review of the scholarly literature. In this respect, it is strongly recommended to advanced graduate and doctoral students interested in the setting-up of game-theoretical models. The second part of the book, which presents the empirical illustration of the revisionist model, is slightly weaker. The author obviously conducted intensive investigation and therefore presents solid empirical work. However, he tends to go too much into detail—this makes the in-depth studies occasionally long-winded, which in turn deflects the reader from the central proposition. However, at the end of each case-study chapter, Drezner manages to connect the empirical illustration with the theoretical model. Moreover, the detailed case studies enhance the book's attractiveness for a broader readership.

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University of Konstanz

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Vogel, David (1995) *Trading up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: Harvard University Press)

Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi (eds), *Beyond Japan: the dynamics of East Asian regionalism*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006, ISBN10 0801444004, ISBN13 9780801444005, hbk, ISBN10 0801472504, ISBN13 9780801472503 (pbk), 344 pp

David Shambaugh (ed), *Power shift: China and Asia's new dynamics*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 2006, ISBN10 0520245377, ISBN13 9780520245372, hbk, ISBN10 0520245709, ISBN13 9780520245709 (pbk), 402 pp

In the middle of the 1980s, the international politics and political economy of East Asia seemed relatively straightforward. Japan had the dominant economy, the United States was the decisive and geo-political military actor, and China appeared

no threat to the pre-eminence of either in their respective realms. Over the past decade, East Asia has changed more radically than anyone viewing the world from the last years of the Cold War and the heady days of Japanese economic triumphalism might possibly have been able to imagine. Japan's economy descended first into recession and then eight years of deflation; the US has found that its military power in the region no longer automatically translates into decisive political influence over its allies there; and China has recreated itself as an economic giant and military power. All this has happened against a backdrop of a deepening internationalization of economic life, the creation for the first time of a rule-based multilateral trading order with the authority to enforce, and the emergence of a unipolar geopolitical world. The questions, addressed in different ways by these two illuminating and comprehensive edited volumes, are: what are the consequences of these changes for the region and the rest of the world, and how much of the political complexities of the old East Asia survive despite these changes?

The two books under review start in rather different places. The volume edited by David Shambaugh is primarily concerned with China, while that edited by Peter Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi focuses on Japan. Concentrating on Japan, Katzenstein, Shiraishi and their contributors conclude that less has changed in East Asia than meets the eye. The obsession, as they see it, with China's rise and Japan's economic problems masks some enduring realities. Japan's economy, measured in gross domestic product (GDP) in dollars, remains significantly larger than China's and is technologically far superior, and Japan's total defence outlays and the operational sophistication of its military forces surpass those of China.

Whilst, as Katzenstein puts it, the Japanization of the East Asian economy is now over, Sinicization is not 'remaking east Asia in the likeness of China' (11). Rather, the cumulative effects of the political, economic and social changes that have taken place have been to create a meaningful region out of East Asia, one that is held together by something other than American power and the fear of communism. This new East Asia is manifested in the array of recent trade agreements within the region, growing financial cooperation, and deepening overlapping production networks. Together, these developments are part of a phenomenon of regionalization, which, unlike in the past, exists beyond any specific national model. The chapters of *Beyond Japan: the dynamics of East Asian regionalism* offer important case studies of different aspects of this phenomenon. The arguments that come out of them put little premium on coercion for understanding what is happening or what may happen in the future. Here, learning, competitive collaboration, emulation and market-based mechanisms drive politics, not states and power. By misreading China's seemingly muscular rise, and downplaying Japan's residual economic and cultural strength, too many scholars and commentators, Katzenstein and Shiraishi argue, overlook the evidence that genuine social, economic and cultural foundations for a new East Asia that transcend national states have taken root.

In asking questions about the implications for Asia of China's rise in the way that it does, *Power shift: China and Asia's new dynamics* puts far greater emphasis on China's extraordinary rebirth and the consequences of that resurrection for other Asian states. As this book makes extremely clear, it is wrong to assume that the impact of China's rise on the region can be thought of in overly general terms. China's rise affects different parts of Asia in rather different ways. Whatever the extent of China and Japan's mutual economic dependence and their need to cooperate over the vast stock of US Treasury bonds they have accumulated since 2000, the situation in Central

Asia—especially given the assertiveness of the United States there since 2001—is, as John Garver explains in his insightful chapter, far more obviously volatile.

Some of the contributors are nonetheless optimistic that globalization and economic convergence within East Asia in particular, combined with what they take to be Beijing's strategic understanding that peace and cooperation are necessary conditions of continuing development, will ensure that China's rise can advance the interests of its Asian neighbours without unravelling US alliances or threatening American geopolitical and military power in the region. For the optimists to be right even in those parts of the continent where mutual economic interests are readily apparent, economic interdependence must act as a real constraint even when the territorial and security interests of states conflict and the political judgements of governments bitterly clash. Ultimately, this must take us back to the issue of the place of the US in Asia, and the question of whether a superpower from outside the region can continue to exercise the power that it does without producing a will to resist, whatever the demons that relations between China and Japan, and China and Japan and other Asian states might let loose. Here, the disagreements between the contributors are most acute. David Shambaugh and David Lampton are relatively sanguine and Lampton, especially, is convinced that China's rise is a crucial engine for regional and global economic growth and that American policy should work to deepen China's integration. By contrast, Bates Gill, Michael Swaine and Robert Sutter see evidence of growing instability in the region that cannot be contained by either regional market integration or globalization.

Whilst nobody disputes that Taiwan is an obvious test of how to read the consequences of the new economic interdependence between China and the US, the legacy of the Asian Financial Crisis is perhaps a more revealing prism through which to think about these questions, both because of the sheer rawness of the crisis as a political phenomenon that so dramatically brought so many different things into focus and because of the flurry of regional diplomatic activity that has taken place in its aftermath. For Lampton, China's defence of the renminbi and its contributions to the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) loans for Thailand and Indonesia were the crucial facts about the crisis, because they marked a watershed in China's approach to the US. But, as Sutter stresses, the crisis gave birth to ASEAN + 3, which has become a political site through which both China and Japan have pushed projects in trade and finance that have excluded the US. Whether a regional free-trade area could eventually actually allow East Asian states to become less dependent on exports to American markets, or whether an expanded Chiang Mai Initiative could operate beyond the IMF, remains to be seen. Indeed, it is far from clear exactly how far either Chinese or Japanese leaders might even conceive ASEAN + 3 as a vehicle for long-term autonomy from the US. Yet its very formation in response to the deep resentment that was felt across East Asia about American behaviour during the Asian Financial Crisis, and the initiatives that have come out of it so far, do suggest that these governments do not want the US to participate in the regional institutions that manage economic interdependence. Economic interdependence in conditions of complicated power dynamics is just as likely to produce political tension as political cooperation.

As Jonathan Pollack notes in his synoptic concluding chapter, what will matter in the end is events, and how those with power react if and when, for example, Taiwan flares or the non-proliferation regime in East Asia collapses. Their responses will ignore economic interdependence across the region and across the

Pacific at their peril, just as they will need to be understood in a context of growing regionalization. But that does not mean that interdependence or regionalization will either determine anything or rule anything out. East Asia does not have to become the world's major geopolitical problem, but neither has any economic, social, cultural or political development of the last two decades made East Asia inherently safe for the rest of the world.

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